The presence of intelligence and rationality in Artificial Intelligence and the Internet requires a new context of analysis in which Herbert Simon’s approach to the sciences of the artificial is surpassed in order to grasp the role of information in our contemporary setting. This new framework requires taking into account some relevant aspects. In the historical endeavor of building up AI and the Internet, minds and machines have interacted over the years and in many ways through the interrelation between (...) scientific creativity and technological innovation. Philosophically, minds and machines can have epistemological, methodological and ontological differences, which are based on the distinct configuration of human intelligence and artificial intelligence. Their comparison with rationality and its various forms is particularly relevant. Scientifically, AI and the Internet belong to the sciences of the artificial, because they work on designs that search for specific aims, following selected processes in order to achieve expected results. Technologically, AI and the Internet require the support of information and communication technologies. These have an instrumental role regarding the existence of AI and the Internet. Also ICT shape their diverse forms of configuration over the years.Within this framework, this paper offers a new context of analysis that goes beyond Simon’s and follows four main steps: the interaction between scientific creativity and technological innovation as the philosophico-methodological setting for Artificial Intelligence and the Internet; artificial intelligence and human intelligence as epistemological basis for machines and minds, where the differences between artificial intelligence and human intelligence are made explicit and the analysis of minds and machines is made from the perspective of rationality ; intention and its difference with design of machine learning are considered to distinguish human intelligence from artificial intelligence; and the internal and external aspects of artificial designs in contemporary society are considered through the perspective of rationality, which leads to the transition from intelligence to rationality in the Internet as well as to the historicity of information. (shrink)

Mortensen studies dual intuitionistic logic by dualizing topos internal logic, but he did not study a sequent calculus. In this paper I present a sequent calculus for complement-topos logic, which throws some light on the problem of giving a dualization for LJ.

In this classic work, Herbert Marcuse takes as his starting point Freud's statement that civilization is based on the permanent subjugation of the human instincts, his reconstruction of the prehistory of mankind - to an interpretation of the basic trends of western civilization, stressing the philosophical and sociological implications.

In this paper, I defend a non-mechanistic interpretation of Kant's philosophy of nature. My interpretation contradicts the robust tradition of reading Kant as a mechanist about nature – or as someone who endorses the view that we can know the internally purposive causality characteristic of organisms has no place in nature. By attending closely to Kant's remarks about the possibility of internal purposiveness in nature and to key premises from Kant's arguments in the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment, we shall see (...) that it is not only plausible, but preferable, to believe that internally purposive things (i.e., organisms) exist in nature. Making room for such a belief leaves Kant with a philosophy of nature that simultaneously aligns with and surpasses the philosophies of nature offered up by his Early Modern predecessors. (shrink)

Are norms of inquiry in tension with epistemic norms? I provide a (largely) negative answer, turning to a picture of epistemic practices as rule-governed games. The idea is that, while epistemic norms are correctness standards for the attitudes involved in epistemic games, norms of inquiry derive from the aims of those games. Attitudes that, despite being epistemically correct, are inadvisable regarding the goals of some inquiry are just like bad (but legal) moves in basketball or chess. I further consider cases (...) in which the aims of inquiry recommend breaking epistemic norms. I compare them to strategic infractions, which are common in many coherent games. Finally, I explore the connections between rules and aims in games and in inquiry. I show that in both cases respecting the rules is constitutively required for satisfying the aims of the practice. (shrink)

[Recipient of the 2024 Inter-American Philosophy Award] Philosophers have recently debated whether the social identity category "Latinx" picks out a race (Alcoff 2006), an ethnicity (Gracia 2008), or something else altogether (Arango and Burgos 2021). Rather than defending one or several of these ways of understanding US Latinx as a political or social group, my paper focuses on the personal social identity turmoil young US Latinx people feel and explores the history of inter-American thought to seek a remedy for it. (...) Three prominent American philosophers – José Martí, Alain Locke, and Emilio Uranga – combine to teach us that, while the US Latinx strives for belonging, they find themselves in a situation of unbelonging. The tension that results from the desire to belong but the reality of unbelonging produces a deep-seated anxiety that has come to characterize the US Latinx condition. I suggest that an effective tool for coping with this anxiety, affirming our identity, and building community is the activity of doing inter-American, Latin American, and Latinx Philosophy. (shrink)

In this rejoinder to the critical comments elicited by my essay “Existential Hypotheses,” I propose to deal first with the challenge coming from the avowedly different philosophical outlook of Professor Churchman. My other critics, Professors Frank, Hempel, Nagel and Ramsperger, on the whole, share my basic conception of the tasks of philosophy of science and epistemology, even if they dissent in one important respect or another from the special solution I suggested. But since I discern even in Professor Nagel's remarks (...) a pragmatist or instrumentalist strain akin to the major contentions of Professor Churchman, it will be well to begin with a defense and further clarification of my underlying point of view. Only after this restatement of my platform will I undertake to defend semantic realism against the specific criticisms advanced by the last four authors. (shrink)

A contra-classical logic is a logic that, over the same language as that of classical logic, validates arguments that are not classically valid. In this paper I investigate whether there is a single, non-trivial logic that exhibits many features of already known contra-classical logics. I show that Mortensen’s three-valued connexive logic _M3V_ is one such logic and, furthermore, that following the example in building _M3V_, that is, putting a suitable conditional on top of the \(\{\sim, \wedge, \vee \}\) -fragment of (...) _LP_, one can get a logic exhibiting even more contra-classical features. (shrink)

The paper considers recent proposals by Armstrong, Dretske, and Tooley that revive the view that statements of laws of nature are grounded by the existence of higher order facts relating universals. Several objections to such a view are raised and an alternative analysis, recognizing general facts, is considered. Such an alternative is shown to meet a number of the objections raised against the appeal to higher order facts and it is also related to views of Hume and Wittgenstein. Further objections (...) are then raised to all the non-Humean "realist" attempts to provide special facts to ground the laws of nature. (shrink)

Este trabajo ha sido seleccionado para la V Olimpiada de Filosofía que organiza FICUM en la modalidad de secundaria y bachillerato, para promocionar la filosofía entre los jóvenes.

The classic pejorative designation of populism currently coexists with its recent vindication. From certain left-wing political and intellectual circles, the revival of this category is part of a strategy aimed at bringing together unsatisfied demands in an emancipatory key. In line with Ernesto Laclau's theory, one of the paradigmatic examples of this tendency is Chantal Mouffe's left-populist proposal. Different critical approaches object that, in the eagerness to deepen and to radicalise democracy, these impulses often challenge its limits and flirt with (...) political logics that could completely blur them. Thus, the feasibility of this emancipatory strategy seems to be tied to the ever-problematic compatibility between populism and democracy, especially to its possible normative and institutional modulations. This article will argue that the populist conception projected by Mouffe is relatively autonomous from Laclau's, and that, unlike Laclau's, it has its own prospects of agonism and civicrepublicanism that can make room for the institutional dimension and the normativity constitutive of the liberal democratic order. (shrink)

From lectures over the BBC by a Cambridge professor on answers to our problems on the meaning of life.

Alberic of Paris put forward an argument, ‘the most embarrassing of all twelfth-century arguments’ according to Christopher Martin, which shows that the connexive principles contradict some other logical principles that have become deeply entrenched in our most widely accepted logical theories. Building upon some of Everett Nelson’s ideas, we will show that the steps in Alberic of Paris’ argument that should be rejected are precisely the ones that presuppose the validity of schemas that are nowadays taken as some of the (...) most trivial logical truths: (A∧B) → A and (A∧B) → B, i.e. Simplification. (shrink)

Las palabras iniciales del Gorgias son una pista importante para comprender la caracterización literaria y filosófica del personaje Calicles dentro del diálogo platónico. Así, que Platón colocara en boca de Calicles un saludo donde se mencionan explícitamente la guerra y el enfrentamiento muestra lo importante que estas actividades son para este personaje. El resto del diálogo sirve para desarrollar este aspecto del alma de Calicles, quien, tanto en sus intervenciones como en su accionar en la conversación, deja clara su defensa (...) de un modo de vida definido por el honor y el reconocimiento público en el ámbito político, el sometimiento de otros, así como la satisfacción de toda clase de apetitos y deseos como elementos constitutivos de una vida feliz. En tal sentido, las primeras palabras del diálogo nos ofrecen un primer vistazo del personaje Calicles que es coherente con la presentación de este en todo el diálogo. (shrink)

New computer systems of discovery create a research program for logic and philosophy of science. These systems consist of inference rules and control knowledge that guide the discovery process. Their paths of discovery are influenced by the available data and the discovery steps coincide with the justification of results. The discovery process can be described in terms of fundamental concepts of artificial intelligence such as heuristic search, and can also be interpreted in terms of logic. The traditional distinction that places (...) studies of scientific discovery outside the philosophy of science, in psychology, sociology, or history, is no longer valid in view of the existence of computer systems of discovery. It becomes both reasonable and attractive to study the schemes of discovery in the same way as the criteria of justification were studied: empirically as facts, and logically as norms. (shrink)

Despite their distinct objects of study, the human behavioral sciences all include models of individual human behavior. Unity in the behavioral sciences requires that there be a common underlying model of individual human behavior, specialized and enriched to meet the particular needs of each discipline. Such unity does not exist, and cannot be easily attained, since the various disciplines have incompatible models and disparate research methodologies. Yet recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for unity in the behavioral (...) sciences, incorporating core principles from all fields, and based upon theoretical tools (game theory and the rational actor model) and data gathering techniques (experimental games in the laboratory and field) that transcend disciplinary boundaries. This article sketches a set of principles aimed at fostering such a unity. Key Words: behavioral science • game theory • experimental economics • rational actor model. (shrink)

Desde el inicio de la Modernidad, la narrativa ha evolucionado tanto como lo ha hecho el pensamiento, apreciándose de un modo sustancial en los giros del gusto y en la construcción de personajes. Bajo esta premisa, en el presente artículo se analizan las diferencias entre los prototipos ejemplares y no ejemplares de la ficción, poniendo el foco en el medio audiovisual. Partiendo de la teoría de la imitación y de la imitación de prototipos establecida por Javier Gomá, se revisan algunos (...) arquetipos de personajes amorales que, compartiendo su carácter no ejemplar, despiertan una fascinación estética ajena y contraria a la que provocan en el ámbito de la moral. Con el objetivo de dar una explicación a este fenómeno, se acude a la separación de juicios establecida por Friedrich Schiller y por otros teóricos que siguen su estela, como Adam Kotsko, y se señalan las posibles contradicciones implícitas en la faceta amoral de los personajes, cuando su carácter no ejemplar supone una referencia para sectores sociales concretos, convirtiéndose la ficción en el punto de partida del proceso imitativo. (shrink)

In recent years, we have experienced rapid development of advanced technology, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI), intended to interact with and augment the abilities of humans in practically every area of life. With the rapid growth of new capabilities, such as those enabled by generative AI (e.g., ChatGPT), AI is increasingly at the center of human communication and collaboration, resulting in a growing recognition of the need to understand how humans and AI can integrate their inputs in collaborative teams. (...) However, there are many unanswered questions regarding how human–AI collective intelligence will emerge and what the barriers might be. Truly integrated collaboration between humans and intelligent agents may result in a different way of working that looks nothing like what we know now, and it is important to keep the essential goal of human societal well-being and prosperity a priority. In this special issue, we begin to scope out the underpinnings of a socio-cognitive architecture for Collective HUman-MAchine INtelligence (COHUMAIN), which is the study of the capability of an integrated human and machine (i.e., intelligent technology) system to achieve goals in a wide range of environments. This topic consists of nine papers including a description of the conceptual foundation for a socio-cognitive architecture for COHUMAIN, empirical tests of some aspects of this architecture, research on proposed representations of intelligent agents that can jointly interact with humans, empirical tests of human–human and human–machine interactions, and philosophical and ethical issues to consider as we develop these systems. (shrink)

The mind as a whole escapes objective studies because belief in mind- independent reality is self-contradictory and by definition excludes subjective experience (awareness, 'consciousness') from reality. The mind's center therefore vanishes in studies which imply exclusive objectivism or empiricism. This conceptual difficulty can be counteracted by acknowledging that all mental and world structures arise within an unstructured origin- and-matrix for knowledge-structures and beliefs. The mind's structure is thus at the center of reality. Use of such a zero-structure reference can also (...) help to clarify some related conceptual difficulties and to bridge the gap between the 'two cultures'. (shrink)

We examine a definition of the mutual information of two reals proposed by Levin in [5]. The mutual information iswhereK is the prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity. A realAis said to have finite self-information ifI is finite. We give a construction for a perfect Π10class of reals with this property, which settles some open questions posed by Hirschfeldt and Weber. The construction produces a perfect set of reals withK≤+KA+f for any given Δ20fwith a particularly nice approximation and for a specific choice of (...) f it can also be used to produce a perfect Π10set of reals that are low for effective Hausdorff dimension and effective packing dimension. The construction can be further adapted to produce a single perfect set of reals that satisfyK≤+KA+f for allfin a ‘nice’ class of Δ20functions which includes all Δ20orders. (shrink)

An in-depth study of Aquinas's doctrine of the actus essendi.

Voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) have gained popularity in recent times as stakeholders strengthen pressure on private firms to address the climate crisis. In this article, I analyze a type of VEP with increasing importance within the private sector: environmental coalitions. Focusing on US publicly traded firms, I show that the firms that join a green coalition are greener than others and that they were also greener before becoming members. I apply a difference-in-differences design, using the fact that different firms became (...) members at different points in time, and find no effect of membership on different measures of environmental performance. Why, then, do firms incur the costs of creating and maintaining these coalitions? I show that shareholder pressure, in particular from liberal and active individual shareholders, can explain this behavior. Taken together, the findings suggest that membership in a green coalition can be a tool for firms to signal their environmental credentials when faced with pressure from pro-environmental stakeholders. (shrink)

My dissertation defends a non-mechanistic interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of nature. Inspired by the picture of nature in the Critique of Pure Reason and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, most readers align Kant with Early Modern mechanists, who claim that we can know that the internally purposive form of causality characteristic of organisms has no place in nature. To these mechanistic readers, Kant banishes internal purposiveness from nature. To moderate mechanistic interpreters, because we cannot know whether there are internally purposive (...) things in nature and we can demonstrate that mechanism applies to nature, Kant pushes us to believe that any seemingly internally purposive natural products will eventually be explained in mechanistic terms. To strong mechanistic interpreters, Kant gives us the tools to know that there is no room for the special kind of teleology organisms exhibit in nature. My non-mechanistic interpretation rejects this trend by arguing that Kant urges us to believe that the internally purposive activity characteristic of organisms exists in nature. Belief in this context is a firm, positive, and voluntary attitude that aligns with and serves a subject’s interests and ends, and that has implications for the subject’s rational action, assertion, and deliberation. Kant’s stated goal in the third Critique is to bridge the gulf between freedom and nature. My non-mechanistic interpretation offers a new account of how Kant promises to construct this bridge. (shrink)

The argument from thinking in Aristotle’s On Ideas deals with the problem of ‘presence in absence’. It argues that, to solve it, one must posit Forms. Scholars claim that Aristotle takes the argument as valid either for Forms or for his own universals. I argue against both alternatives, for Aristotle thinks that the problem that motivates the argument does not require a metaphysical solution, but only a psychological solution.

For the sake of universalism and against totalitarianism, discursive ethics has shown with Jürgen Habermas a practical deficit by denying moral philosophy the possibility of reflecting on the alienating conditions for dialogue through a specific ethos. This article examines how Hartmut Rosa's theory of resonance can revitalise the debate on the conditions that can undermine the motivation for dialogue in accelerated societies, based not on the concept of ethos, but on the concept of Modus der Weltbeziehung [Mode of world-relationship]. En (...) aras del universalismo y en contra del totalitarismo, la ética discursiva ha mostrado con Jürgen Habermas un déficit práctico al negar a la filosofía moral la posibilidad de reflexionar sobre las condiciones alienantes del diálogo desde un ethos concreto. El presente artículo analiza el modo en que la teoría de la resonancia formulada por Hartmut Rosa permite revitalizar el debate sobre las condiciones que pueden minar la motivación al diálogo en las sociedades aceleradas sin apoyarse en el concepto de ethos, sino en el de Modus der Weltbeziehung [modo de relacionarse con el mundo]. (shrink)

The commonly accepted interpretations ofFermat's method of extreme values tell us that this is a curious method, based on an approximate equality and burdened with several contradictions withinFermat's writings. In this article, both a philological approach taking into account that there is only one manuscript written inFermat's own handwriting and a mathematical approach taking into account that brilliant mathematicians usually are not so very confused when talking about their own central mathematical ideas are combined. A new hypothesis is put forward (...) which renders the mathematics clear and coherent and which does not need the assumption thatFermat was confused. Probably a number of words have been added byCarcavy in two ofFermat's papers. (shrink)

. In this paper we present a proposal that (i) could validate more relations in the square than those allowed by classical logic (ii) without a modification of canonical notation neither of current symbolization of categorical statements though (iii) with a different but reliable semantics.